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During the Colonial era usury laws in the United States were strict both in terms of the maximum rate
that could be charged and the penalties that would be imposed. In Massachusetts in eighteenth century,
for example, the maximum rate was 6 percent, and both principal and interest were forfeited if usury
could be proved against the lender. The laws were eased during the early national period, and in many
states they were repealed, although the United States never completely abandoned its system of usury
laws. By 1870, when a limited reaction set in, the liberalization had reached the point where the great
bulk of commercial transactions must have been largely unaffected by the usury laws, at least in non-
crisis years. Two factors seem to have been paramount in producing the liberalization: changes in ideas
about the effectiveness of government regulation in general and about the effectiveness of usury laws
in particular, and competition among the states for capital. This history suggests that the usury laws,
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1. Why Should Economic Historians Study Usury Laws?
1 
With a few notable exceptions, such as Friedman (1963) and Glaeser and 
Scheinkman (1998), usury laws have been ignored by historians and economists writing 
about the financial history of the United States. Many of the classic financial histories of the 
United States do not even mention them. Yet there are a number of good reasons for 
studying usury laws. For one thing usury laws are, arguably, the most ubiquitous forms of 
economic regulation. They are mentioned in the Bible and the Koran. There were usury laws 
in ancient Rome, although not in classical Athens (Finley 1953). And, the medieval 
canonists developed a detailed theory of usury. Usury laws have not been confined to 
countries influenced by European cultural traditions. In India, during the Buddhist period, it 
was recommended that interest be limited to 15 percent per year on secured loans and to 60 
percent per year on unsecured loans. Seth (1955, 6). In traditional China the maximum rate 
was 3 percent per month, and the penalty for charging more was 40 to 100 blows with the 
light cane. (Alabaster 1899, 550-51). Usury laws, moreover, have been the subject of classic 
works of literature, such as “The Merchant of Venice.” The usury laws in England were 
repealed in 1854 (although legislation protecting borrowers was reinstated at the turn of the 
century), but in the United States they were continued in many states down to the present 
day.  
Usury laws, unlike most other forms of economic regulation, are relatively easy to 
quantify. During the period of concern here they usually took the form of a maximum rate, a 
round number: 0, 6, 10, etc. The penalties for evading the usury laws, moreover, although 
often neglected in discussions of the law, were also easily quantified. The penalty was 
typically forfeiture of interest and principal, forfeiture of interest alone, or something 2 
similar. By taking a standard loan contract we can reduce these disparate penalties to a 
common denominator.  To be sure, usury laws sometimes included provisions that are not 
easily quantified. The maximum legal rate, for example, might differ among lenders or by 
type of loan, and criminal penalties might be imposed. But for the most part, the usury laws 
can be quantified, allowing us to draw a long-run picture of the history of usury laws, and to 
make generalizations about the determinants of the history of usury laws that may carryover 
to less easily quantified forms of regulation.  
The level of the rate of usury, moreover, may give us some insight into the common 
rate of interest for times and places when market quotations are scarce. Indeed, in some 
cases the rate of usury may be a more accurate reflection of the common rate, than the 
quotations normally relied upon, which are often the rates on government bonds, or other 
atypical instruments. The usefulness of the rate of usury as a proxy for the common rate of 
interest would depend on how usury rates were determined in relation to the bulk of credit 
transactions. So an understanding of the political economy of maximum rates can contribute 
to their usefulness as a record of rates. 
The main reason economic historians neglect usury laws is the conviction that they 
are easily evaded and therefore have no effect. Suppose a borrower and lender want to 
contract a loan at 30 percent interest when the legal maximum is 10 percent. What is to stop 
the borrower from signing a bond that says that 10 percent is to be paid on $100 (a legal 
contract), while in fact receiving only $85 in cash, or perhaps paying a “fee” of  $15 for the 
services of arranging the loan?
2 The answer is nothing. The suggestion then, is that the legal 
maximum has no effect.  3 
Alternative means of evading the laws, moreover, are legion. Perhaps one of the 
most frequently used ways of evading usury laws is by hiding a usurious payment as charge 
for late payment. One of the earliest stories I have seen about this form of evasion in the 
United States is said to have occurred in Virginia in 1760. The legal maximum was 5 
percent. But interest at 10 percent could be charged on a bill of exchange that was refused. 
A “gentlemen of some means,” it is said, agreed to draw a bill on a firm in London that he 
did not know so that his banker could charge 10 percent. Unfortunately, the firm on which 
the bill was drawn recognized the name of the drawer, assumed that he intended to open a 
relationship, and so accepted the bill. The banker complained that he had been tricked by 
being given a good bill instead of a bad one! (Kirkland 1865, vol. 1, 217.) 
3 
Although these ways of evading the law, and many similar devices, provide a good 
deal of protection to the lender – courts are generally unwilling to set aside a signed 
contract, unless they have a strong motive for doing so – evasive devices do not reduce a 
lender's risk from the law to zero. True the lender has, as Shylock says, his bond. But should 
a borrower refuse to pay, and offer usury as a defense, a judge is always in a position to 
believe the testimony of the borrower and whatever evidences the borrower can offer, as 
Shylock found when he finally had his day in court. The risk that the borrower will escape 
paying, a risk that cannot be reduced to zero as long as the law is on the books, is bound to 
have some effect on the behavior of borrowers and lenders. 
I now believe that when maximum rates were low, and penalties high, usury laws 
had a substantial impact on the structure of lending. The effects of usury laws on capital 
formation or the distribution of income, however, will not be our initial focus. Instead, the 
narrative will focus on uncovering the determinants of changes of usury rates and penalties. 4 
Nevertheless, as is often the case in economic research, a light focused on one target 
illuminates others. 
Today, usury laws are still important, but mainly as consumer protection laws. The 
laws at issue in the current controversy over the extremely high rates charged for “payday 
loans” -- small loans typically due at the next payday and secured by a postdated check or 
by an agreement that permits a bank to deduct principal and interest from a paycheck -- have 
their roots in nineteenth century usury laws discussed below.
4 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the history 
of thought about usury laws through the period of liberalization in the nineteenth century. 
Section 3 discusses the repeal of the British laws, an important precedent for the United 
States. Section 4 discusses the changes in U.S. usury laws in the nineteenth century from a 
quantitative perspective.  Section 5 discusses the debate over the usury provision of the 
National Banking Act, which throws a good deal of light on the relationships among ideas, 
the western advance, and other factors that influenced the liberalization of the usury laws. 
Section 6 discusses some of the evidence that suggests that the economic historian’s 
working assumption that the usury laws had no effect needs rethinking. Section 7 draws 
some conclusions. The narrative is written as if two factors -- changing ideas about the 
efficacy of usury laws, and competition among states for capital -- explain the changing 
structure of the usury laws. But the evidence for correlation, it must be admitted, is much 
stronger than the evidence for causation. Perhaps what follows is best regarded as a listing 
of the candidate hypotheses. 
 5 
2. The Changing Intellectual Climate 
The evolution of usury laws paralleled, and I believe to some extent was produced 
by, changes in ideas about usury. A brief sketch of history of the “high theory” of usury 
laws will therefore be a useful way of setting the stage for the history U.S. usury laws that 
follows, and of describing one of the explanatory factors. Broadly speaking we can 
distinguish two strands of support for usury laws: moral arguments that can be traced to the 
Bible and to the ancient Greek philosophers, and economic arguments that can be traced to 
the mercantilists and (of all people) to Adam Smith. The erosion of these supports for usury 
laws coincided with liberalizations of the law. 
The evolution of religious and philosophical ideas about usury could fill many 
volumes.
5 Here I will simply summarize some of the ideas that seem to have survived to 
influence American lawmakers. The Old Testament, as is well known, prohibits interest 
taking among the Jews, although not between Jews and non-Jews. There are three passages. 
In two, the prohibition on taking interest follows admonitions to be charitable toward the 
poor, and so seems connected mainly with charity toward the poor. But the most famous 
passage, Deuteronomy 23:19, appears to be more general: "You shall not lend upon interest 
to your brother, interest on money, interest on victuals, interest on anything that is lent for 
interest. To a foreigner you may lend upon interest…" This passage became the basis for the 
belief of the early Christians and the medieval church that the prohibition on usury should 
be extended to all Christians. And it left the way open for the Jews living among Christians 
to become moneylenders. The New Testament also contains passages that seem to tell 
against lending at interest, particularly Luke 6:35: “Lend freely, hoping nothing thereby.” It 
has been suggested by Taeusch (1942, 313) that the survival of usury restrictions in the 6 
United States, although as we will see in a greatly attenuated form, as opposed to their 
repeal in Britain can be traced to the greater influence of old-testament fundamentalism in 
the United States. 
The tension between the stark religious doctrine that the lending of money among 
brothers was immoral and the needs of a commercial economy for credit produced the 
development of a complex usury doctrine that legitimized interest under a number of 
names.
6 Thomas Aquinas thought that compensation for actual loss (damnum emergens) 
was permissible, and he discussed although with hesitation compensation for cessation of 
gain (lucrum cessans). Other exceptions included compensation for damage caused by the 
failure to return payment at the agreed time (poena conventionalis). According to 
Cunningham (1905, vol. 1, 258) this exception, an obvious way of evading the usury 
prohibition, took a prominent place in medieval transactions.  
The struggle over the morality of interest taking changed abruptly with the 
Protestant Reformation. Benjamin Nelson (1969) describes the revolution. Although some 
of the preaching of the reformers was opposed to taking interest, the reformers ultimately 
abandoned the idea of creating a "New Jerusalem" – with the implication that Christians 
would be forced to follow the ancient prohibition against lending at interest. Nelson sees 
Calvin as the key figure because he clearly stated that the rules about taking interest that 
bound the ancient Israelites, although perhaps right for their time and place, were not 
binding in a modern society. Religious thought had progressed, in the apt subtitle of 
Nelson's book, From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood.
7  
The other tradition that left a residual in nineteenth-century thinking was that of the 
ancient Greek philosophers. Aristotle and Plato believed that money was barren. With other 7 
forms of capital, cattle for example, we can see the natural multiplication, but not with 
money. The taking of interest, therefore, was unnatural, and to be prohibited. Centuries later 
Alfred Marshall was still devoting space in his Principles of Economics to refuting this 
argument. Marshall explains at length why lending a horse (clearly a form of capital that is 
naturally productive) is no different than lending money.  
  Secular thinking about usury laws (in the English speaking world) can be traced in a 
trajectory of key contributions reaching from mercantilist writers, in particular Sir Josiah 
Child, who strongly endorsed usury laws to John Stuart Mill, who denounced them as a 
religious superstition. To mercantilist writers such as Child (1668) it made good sense for 
the state to control the rate of interest. Child believed that low interest rates were the soul of 
trade. He noted that interest rates were low in Holland, which was clearly a prosperous 
nation. And he argued that much good had come from the official lowering of the rate of 
interest in England from 10 to 8 per cent in 1623, and from 8 to 6 per cent in 1660. (See 
table 1 for the English rates.) The argument was that lowering interest rates prevented the 
“dissipating class,” usually men of property who could borrow on the security of their land, 
from competing with the merchant class. The King, Child noted, would have to pay a higher 
rate than the merchant class, because the lending to the King was risky, but lowering rates 
for the merchant class would lower rates for the King as well. 
  Child’s analysis was not universally accepted. (Ryan 1924, 46-7). Sir William Petty 
wrote a tract opposed to Child’s stand on usury laws. And John Locke attacked Child’s 
position as well. Locke pointed out that there were no usury laws in Holland and that low 
interest rates there were the result rather than the cause of prosperity. Locke did note, 
however, that usury laws might be useful in preventing the indolent from dissipating their 8 
fortunes, a point taken up by later supporters of usury laws. Nevertheless, Child’s essay 
showed that there was a mercantilist as well as moral case to be made for usury laws, and 
Child’s essay appears to have influenced later writers. 
Sir James Steuart, discussed Child's ideas in his magnum opus, Inquiry into the 
Principles of Political Oeconomy published in 1767. Steuart agreed with Child that 
regulating the rate of interest and thereby channeling funds to the merchant class was a good 
idea. But he objected to a sudden and violent pulling down of the official rate, of the sort 
that had happened in 1623 and 1660. All sorts of problems would be created if this were 
tried again, especially if the rate was forced below the rate in rival countries, notably the 
Netherlands. Instead, Steuart recommended a rate sufficiently above the conventional 
commercial rate "so as to leave a reasonable latitude for gentle fluctuations above it." 
  Adam Smith, although critical of much in Steuart, famously took a similar position 
on the rate of interest.
8 Too restrictive an interest ceiling would be a mistake; but a ceiling 
that was above, but not too much above, the market rate would prove beneficial. For the 
underlying reasoning, we can do no better than to quote Smith (1979 [1776], 357). 
The legal rate, it is to be observed, though it ought to be above, ought not to be much 
above the lowest market rate. If the legal rate of interest in Great Britain, for 
example, was fixed so high as eight or ten per cent, the greater part of the money 
which was to be lent, would be lent to prodigals and projectors, who alone would be 
willing to give this high interest. Sober people, who will give for the use of money 
no more than part of what they are likely to make by the use of it, would not venture 
into the competition. A great part of the capital of the country would thus be kept out 
of the hands which were most likely to make a profitable and advantageous use of it, 
and thrown into those which were most likely to waste and destroy it. Where the 
legal rate of interest, on the contrary, is fixed but a very little above the lowest 
market rate, sober people are universally preferred as borrowers, to prodigals and 
projectors. 
 9 
By prodigals Smith meant people who had the wherewithal to borrow large sums of money 
for consumption purposes, perhaps the dissipated son of a rich landlord.
9 And by projectors, 
in this context, he meant entrepreneurs raising money for wild and improbable schemes. 
Smith does not say what examples he has in mind when he speaks of projectors. Steuart 
mentioned the Mississippi and South Sea bubbles in this context, and presumably Smith 
would have included them in a list of foolish schemes touted by projectors, although it 
would have been typical of Smith to have more current examples in mind as well.
10 
  The point in time that economic opinion swung decisively against usury laws can be 
dated with accuracy: the publication of Jeremy Bentham’s Defense of Usury. Cast as a series 
of letters, the first was postmarked Crichoff, in White Russia, January 1787. It was a tour de 
force – passionate, detailed, logical, and filled with rhetorical flourishes. Bentham covered 
most of the points that would be covered in a modern textbook: (1) Usury laws prevent 
mutually beneficial trades among informed adults, (2) usury laws force desperate borrowers 
into the hands of unscrupulous lenders where the borrowers pay higher rates than they 
would in an unfettered market, rates that insure against the risk of nonpayment occasioned 
by the usury laws themselves, (3) the usury laws are often evaded in ways that add to the 
costs of doing business, and so on.  
  Bentham recognized that no argument against usury laws could succeed that did not 
take on Adam Smith, and so the last of his letters was addressed to Smith. Bentham thought 
it unlikely that prodigals would be affected by the lifting of usury laws. As long as a 
prodigal still had property to offer as collateral he could borrow on the same terms as others. 
Once his capital was exhausted, he could only rely on friends and on the delivery of goods 
by tradesmen; borrowing money would be nearly impossible at any rate of interest. It was 10 
on the issue of projectors that Bentham worked the hardest. Smith favored usury laws 
because they kept money out of the hands of foolish projectors. Progress, Bentham asserted, 
had been the result smart projectors. Where would we be, Bentham asks, what would our 
living standards be today, if it had not been for the projectors in the past?  
On the latter issue, Bentham attempted to quote Smith against himself. In the Wealth 
of Nations (1979 [1776], 131) Smith argued that wages would be higher in industries in 
which new firms were established frequently because in those industries projectors would 
have to entice workers away from existing firms by offering higher wages, and there would 
be some inertia of wages paid at the existing firms. To illustrate his point Smith contrasted 
Birmingham, which specialized in industries where demand arose from fashion and fancy, 
and where wages were high, with Sheffield, which specialized in industries where demand 
arose from necessity, and wages were low. To Bentham this meant that Smith had labeled 
Birmingham a “projecting” town and Sheffield an “unprojecting” town. Bentham then 
argued that projecting must be a good thing because Birmingham was more prosperous and 
growing faster than Sheffield, and therefore on his own evidence Smith should concede that 
laws designed to reduce projecting were a mistake. Smith might well have replied that since 
Birmingham's industries had developed under the existing usury law, Birmingham's 
affluence was evidence that moderate usury laws did not discourage sound projectors. 
John Stuart Mill, in his Principles of Political Economy (1920 [1871,1848], 926-
930, 1004), describes the laws as having "originated in a religious prejudice against 
receiving interest on money" and notes, that "this restriction though approved by Adam 
Smith, has been condemned by all enlightened persons since the triumphant onslaught made 
upon it by Bentham in his Letters on Usury."  Thus between Adam Smith and John Stuart 11 
Mill, "weighty” opinion had turned 180 degrees against usury laws. This period, as we will 
see in the next section, also witnessed the abolition of usury laws in Britain, and the 
liberalization of usury laws in the United States. 
Mill was the last of the great British economists of the nineteenth century to devote 
considerable space in his textbook to the discussion of usury laws. In part of course this was 
because the repeal of the usury laws in 1854 made discussion of them a moot point. 
Marshall's Principles, as we noted above, deals with the notion that there is something 
different about lending a horse than lending money, but does not deal with Smith's 
arguments. Arthur Cecil Pigou's The Economics of Welfare does not even mention usury 
laws. 
  What lay behind the change in opinion about usury laws? To some extent, of course, 
the change in thinking about usury laws was simply a part of a much broader intellectual 
revolution that was reflected in economics in the rise of Laissez Faire, and in politics in 
increased concern for democracy and personal liberty. In other words, the fall of the usury 
laws in England, and their liberalization in the United States, was part of the same wave of 
trust in Laissez Faire that helped bring down the Corn Laws, and eliminate other restrictions 
such as those on the price of bread, the export of machinery, and the emigration of skilled 
labor.  
  Were there economic changes that lay behind the change in thinking? According to 
Keynes, The General Theory (1965 [1936], chapter 24, 351-353), keeping the rate of interest 
low was good policy prior to the nineteenth century because, in Keynes's terminology, the 
"marginal efficiency of investment" was low. The industrial revolution raised the marginal 
efficiency of investment and changed the balance of costs and benefits of usury laws. More 12 
worthwhile investment opportunities existed. One can see this in the examples used to 
support or oppose usury laws. Sir James Steuart reached back to the South Sea and 
Mississippi bubbles to show how dangerous projectors could be, and why it would be a 
good idea to keep money out of their hands. John Stuart Mill (1920 [1871,1848], 930) 
pointed to George Stephenson, the railway entrepreneur, who could not have brought his 
plans to completion, Mill claims, without the ability to borrow at high interest rates. In 
Keynes's phrase, when we read Bentham's letter to Smith we may be "hearing the voice of 
the nineteenth century speaking to the eighteenth century." 
Today, we casually accept the idea that the government should regulate the rate of 
interest indirectly through the operations of a central bank. Yet the idea that the government 
should regulate interest rates directly through usury laws seems foreign. Prior to the 
nineteenth century, however, monies were as much international as national, and the ability 
of government banks, such as the bank of England, to influence interest rates was extremely 
limited. In such a world the main national instrument for regulating the rate of interest was 
the rate of usury. The rise of national currencies controlled by national banks created an 
alternative mechanism for controlling interest rates. It was now possible to eliminate usury 
laws without giving up all governmental control over interest. And the new institutions 
would have maximum influence, if their efforts to raise interest rates were not inhibited by 
usury rates. In the United States, as we will see below, the decisive pressure to liberalize the 
usury laws did not come so much from the eastern projectors of new industrial firms, as 
from the western projectors of new agricultural settlements. 
Defense of Usury was an immediate and long lasting hit.
11 In England it received 
favorable reviews and was endorsed by important political figures. Potentially the most 13 
important, of course, was Adam Smith, and here hangs a tale. It was reported to Bentham 
that Smith had told a friend that "Defense of Usury was the work of a very superior man" 
and that Smith had seemed to admit that Bentham was right. Bentham wrote to Smith trying 
to draw a formal concession. But Smith, who by then was very ill, did no more than send 
Bentham a copy of the Wealth of Nations. Smith's recantation never became a reality. 
We cannot know for certain whether if Smith had been in better health, he would 
have changed his mind on usury laws, or what the effect would have been. Bentham himself 
(1952-54 [1787], 189), in his letter to Smith thought that a declaration by Smith against 
usury laws, especially considering Smith's earlier support of them, would be worth many 
votes. “We should have the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer abjuring his annual motion [to 
reduce the rate of interest in Ireland] in the face of the House, and L [or]d Hawkesbury who, 
it has been said, is Mr. Pitt’s tutor in this wise business, quietly and silently putting his 
papers and calculations into the fire.”  A similar conjecture is not out of place, it seems to 
me, for the United States. Banking and interest regulation were debated repeatedly in the 
United States over the coming century. As influential as Bentham's arguments were, the 
weight of Adam Smith remained on the side of those who would maintain controls on 
interest rates. Liberalization of the usury laws might have moved further and faster if the 
name of Adam Smith could have been enlisted in the cause. 
The positive reception of Defense of Usury was international. In France, the Defense 
was translated by someone in Mirabeau's circle, and may have influenced the debate over 
French usury laws then in progress (Stark 1952, 28-29), although the French economists had 
already made known their opposition to usury laws. In Ireland Bentham's tract seems to 14 
have been widely read in Dublin in 1788 when a reduction in the rate of usury from 6 
percent to 5 percent was under debate.  
Bentham was also influential in the United States, although the extent of his 
influence is, inevitably, difficult to measure. Bentham received a letter (Stark 1952, 30-31), 
which reported that "The influence of your writings has already been extensively felt in the 
United States." The letter went on to catalog attempts to repeal the usury laws in 
Mississippi, Alabama, Virginia, and New Hampshire as evidence of the triumph of 
Bentham’s principles.
12 
Morton J. Horwitz (1977, 237-245) investigated the legal literature of the period 
1780-1850. He found that the attacks on usury laws that were written during this period 
reflected Bentham’s ideas, and often mention Bentham explicitly. Horwitz (1977, 242) 
observes, for example, that Thomas Cooper's notes to his 1837 edition of the Statutes of 
South Carolina, comment that "The public notions on the subject of usury have been totally 
changed by Jeremy Bentham's brief treatise on the subject…." The defenses of usury laws 
that Horwitz examined, on the other hand, appear to have gone back to moral, just-price 
considerations, rather than the mercantilist defense. As we will see below, however, hints of 
the mercantilist doctrine can be seen in the Civil War debate over the usury provision of the 
National Banking Act. 
Most of the economic writers covered in Joseph Dorfman’s (1946) classic survey of 
the antebellum era appear to have been disciples of the British economists, and were 
opposed to usury laws. The Reverend John McVickar, who published his Outlines of 
Political Economy, a commentary on J.R. McCulloch, in 1825 was strongly opposed to 
usury laws. Langton Byllesby, who Dorfman (1946, 640) identifies as a Ricardian Socialist, 15 
published his Observations on the Sources and Effects of Unequal Wealth, which includes a 
statement condemning usury laws, in 1826. Stephen Simpson published his Working Man’s 
Manual: A New Theory of Political Economy in 1831, which argued that  “usury laws are 
reprehensible.” The Reverend Francis Wayland, President of Brown, published perhaps the 
first free trade textbook in the United States in 1837, and included a condemnation of usury 
laws. Dorfman (1946, 760).  Jacob Newton Cardozo, editor of the Southern Patriot, who 
Dorfman (1946, 857) called the South’s ablest economic thinker, opposed usury laws and 
called for “freedom of banking.” George Opdyke’s Treatise on Political Economy was 
published in 1851. Opdyke was an enthusiastic follower of John Stuart Mill, and followed 
Mill in denouncing usury laws. (Dorfman 1946, 755-58).  In 1864 Arthur Latham Perry, a 
follower of Bastiat, wrote a series of articles on political economy for the Springfield 
[Massachusetts] Republican, which Dorfman (1946, 981) identified as an influential paper. 
Perry thought usury laws were a mistake, and he was especially critical of the attempt then 
under consideration to limit National Banks to 7 percent, an episode that will be considered 
in more detail below. Perry’s articles, moreover, came a short time before Massachusetts 
repealed its usury laws. 
Indeed, all the antebellum American authors discussed by Dorfman, with the 
exception of Alexander Bryan Johnson who thought that low interest rates brought about by 
usury laws would be good for labor, were strongly opposed to usury laws. It is not 
surprising, perhaps, to find the usury laws being liberalized during a period in which 
weighty opinion was so opposed. Of course, weighty opinion by itself is often insufficient to 
change the law. Economists have often united in their opposition to high tariffs or other 
restrictions on international trade to little effect. Below we will turn to another force at work, 16 
the effort by western states to attract capital. But first we will look at the similar 
liberalization that was taking place in Britain. 
 
3. The Liberalization of the British Usury Laws 
  It is important to note that British laws underwent a similar liberalization at about the 
same time, and that the liberalization in Britain has been attributed partly to ideological and 
intellectual developments. Table 1, which I have compiled from various sources, 
summarizes the history of British usury laws. The modern history of British usury laws 
began in 1545 when a maximum rate of 10 percent was set. Although the law was couched 
in terms of the old exceptions to the church’s prohibition of interest taking, it seemed to 
recognize a new economic reality: Cunningham (1905, 152).  Interest was again prohibited 
in 1551, a law that Adam Smith (1979 [1776], 106] attributed to “religious zeal.” But this 
prohibition was soon reversed, and in 1571 the maximum rate of 10 percent was restored.  
  As suggested by the reversals in the law, there was considerable debate in England 
during the sixteenth century about the morality of interest taking, (Tawney 1925). 
Shakespeare’s exploration of the economics and morality of usury, The Merchant of Venice, 
was written in 1596.
13 Although disagreements about the morality of interest taking were 
intense during the sixteenth century, Cunningham (1905-7, 159) concludes that by 1604 “the 
revolution in public opinion was complete, and that the practice of lending money for 
moderate interest was at last regarded as entirely reputable.” 
As shown in table 1 the maximum rate was lowered to 8 percent in 1624, to 6 
percent in 1660, and to 5 percent in 1713. Adam Smith (1979 [1776], 106) thought that 
these reductions had been made “with great propriety,” and that the changes seem to “have 17 
followed and not to have gone before the market rate of interest.”  This is where things stood 
when Bentham wrote his case against the usury laws: a maximum rate of 5 percent and a 
penalty of three times the principal and interest. 
The next major change appears to have occurred in 1833 when usury limits were 
eliminated on bills of exchange with less than three months to run. This break may have 
been due to the problems created by the 5 percent rule for bill brokers during the crisis of 
1825. The usury laws were finally repealed in 1854. The need for the Bank of England to 
raise its discount rate in times of crisis, a need that became increasingly clear as the Bank’s 
operating procedures took their classic nineteenth century form, may have played a role in 
the repeal. The development of the joint stock company – limited liability was introduced in 
1855 – may also have been a factor. Bond issues would have been more difficult if 
companies were legally barred from paying more than 5 percent. The transition from 
regulated credit markets to unregulated (or at least indirectly regulated) markets, moreover, 
cannot be divorced from the general movement toward Laissez Faire in England, as 
manifested by the famous repeal of the Corn Laws in 1848. 
The English example, as Louis Robinson and Rolf Nugent (1934, 29) point out, was 
soon followed by the repeal of the usury laws in a number of European countries: Denmark 
(1855); Spain (1856); Sardinia, Holland, Norway, and Geneva (1857); and Saxony and 
Sweden (1864).  Canada also followed in 1858. Robinson and Nugent attribute all of these 
repeals to the spread of Laissez Faire in general and to Benthamite ideas about usury in 
particular, and to the example of Britain. Perhaps the international repeal movement also 
owed something to the fear that a country that did not follow suit would risk losing capital to 
Britain and to the countries that had repealed. The repeal movement in the United States 18 
occurred during a similar period, and this fear, as well as the ideological pressures cited by 
Robinson and Nugent, seems to have been at work. 
 
4. The Liberalization of U.S. Usury Laws 
  The basic source for the usury laws to 1890 is George K. Holmes (1892), and 
Holmes and John S. Lord (1895), which summarize the legal history of the usury laws in the 
United States to that date. Where I have been able to check these account against studies of 
individual states, or tables presented in legal journals, Holmes and Lord appears accurate, 
although slight discrepancies in dating do emerge. When I found discrepancies I have 
followed Holmes and Lord, to provide a consistent set of estimates.  
Figure 1 plots the average maximum rate of interest in the United States as a whole, 
and in the thirteen original colonies, from 1750 to 1890. The averages are simple 
unweighted means: Massachusetts and Rhode Island count as equal observations. The 
number of states, of course, is steadily growing so that the population on which the national 
average is based is continually changing. Some laws distinguished between the maximum 
rate permitted when no rate was specified in the contract, and the maximum rate when the 
rate was stated explicitly. The data plotted here reflect the latter. A complication, of course, 
is that some states, such as California, permitted any rate so long as the rate was specified in 
the contract, and some states repealed their laws altogether. My convention was to use 13.01 
percent as the rate for these states when computing the national average. Twelve percent 
was the highest maximum among most states, although rates as high as 20 percent were 
permitted under certain laws, so this convention assigns a rate 1 percent above a relatively 19 
high rate to those states that repealed their usury laws. Figure 1 also shows the average 
excluding states that repealed.  
  Evidently, there is a good deal of inertia in these rates. Massachusetts, to take an 
extreme example, established a rate of 8 percent in 1641. This was lowered to 6 percent in 
1693 where it remained until the usury laws were repealed in 1867, a period of 174 years!
14  
Nevertheless, there is a clear picture of change when we take the long view and look at the 
national average. Maximum rates began to trend upward after the Revolution, peaked in the 
1870s, and then trended downward toward the end of the century. There was, in other 
words, a considerable relaxation of the usury laws, measured by maximum rates, between 
the Revolution and the 1870s.  
Market interest rates began trending downward in the 1870s, so this may have been 
a factor leading to the cutback in usury rates.
15 But the explanatory factors I have been 
stressing also began to change. The ideological tide in the United States began to turn 
against Laissez Faire. The precursors of the Populists and the leftwing of the labor 
movement were making themselves felt. And as the frontier disappeared, the desperate need 
of new communities for mortgage money no longer overrode all other considerations in the 
determination of policies toward financial markets.  
  Figure 2 plots the average penalty. My convention was to assume a loan of $100 and 
excess interest of 10 percent, and then to measure what the lender lost if found guilty of 
usury. For example, if the maximum rate was 6 percent, and the penalty was forfeiture of 
principal plus interest, then the total penalty would be $116: $100 of principal, $6 of legal 
interest, and $10 of usury. On the other hand, if the penalty were simply forfeiture of 
usurious interest, the figure plotted would be $10.  20 
The penalty is probably a more sensitive indicator of the pressures at work in the 
legislature than the maximum rate. As indicated above, maximum rates tended to be sticky, 
perhaps because an attempt to raise the maximum rate would be a red flag that would 
provoke a public outcry. A lessening of the penalties, on the other hand, may have been 
welcomed by the business community, but neglected by the general public. Massachusetts, 
again, is a good example. The penalty set in 1693 was forfeiture of principal and interest 
($116 for the standard contract.) This was lowered to three times the interest ($48 for the 
standard contract) in 1826, and to three times the excess interest ($30 for the standard 
contract) in 1846: liberalization of the penalty but not the rate, which remained at 6 percent. 
Changes in the penalties of this magnitude would have had a significant effect on the 
incentives facing lenders, even at relatively low levels of default risk. Consider the 
following example. The rate of usury is 6 percent. Two potential loans are available to the 
lender. One can be made at the rate of usury and the return will be sufficient to cover the 
risk of default. The alternative can be made at a higher rate but has the added risk of five 
percent that the borrower will default and win on the defense of usury. What rate on the 
second loan will provide the same expected value as the first loan, which could be made at 
the legal maximum? If the penalty were forfeiture of three times the principal and interest, a 
traditional eighteenth century penalty, the required rate would be 24.71 percent.
16 If the 
penalty were simply forfeiture of principal and interest, the required rate would be about 
11.58 percent. If the penalty were three times the interest, the required rate would be only 
7.06 percent.  21 
It is evident from figure 2 that there was a general downward trend in the average 
penalty beginning after the Revolution and continuing into the 1870s. This Figure, perhaps 
even more than Figure 1, provides evidence for a general liberalization of the usury laws.  
It is sometimes thought that the first repeal of the usury laws was in Massachusetts 
in 1867. Massachusetts, it is true, was the first of the Eastern states with a large financial 
center to deregulate. So this was a signal event. But as shown in Table 2 repeal was a 
nationwide phenomenon that began in regions of recent settlement, where interest rates were 
high and the desire to attract additional investment from the East was strong. The first repeal 
was in Alabama in 1818, followed by Illinois in 1819, and Florida in 1822. The first repeal 
that lasted more than a short time was California in 1850. The Massachusetts repeal has 
been attributed to the stirring speech against the usury law in the Massachusetts legislature 
by Richard Henry Dana Jr.
17 (Ryan 1924, 60-62). One may be skeptical -- it is a good 
working hypothesis that legislation is determined by interests and not by speeches -- but it 
was a superb speech. 
Dana recounted all of the economic arguments against usury laws, making them 
vivid to his audience by appealing to experiences with which they would have been familiar. 
Dana also appealed to the academic opponents of usury laws: Bentham, John Stuart Mill, 
Wayland, Smith (based on the alleged capitulation to Bentham), and others. And Dana 
(1881 [1867], 51-52) discussed the danger that capital would move to areas with higher or 
no maximums. In this context he mentions the high midwestern rates and the gap between 
New York (7 percent) and Massachusetts (6 percent). The latter gap, he assured his fellow 
legislators, while too small to interest investors with small sums to lend, would be more than 
enough to interest investors with large sums to lend. 22 
Under the 1850 California law, as under a number of similar statutes, as noted 
above, no limit was imposed on contracts in which the rate of interest was explicitly stated. 
If no rate was specified in the contract, however, the maximum interest allowed was 10 
percent. The penalty in the latter case, if more than 10 percent was charged, was relatively 
light. The borrower could, however, refuse to pay more than 10 percent, and the lender 
could not sue to recover the excess. Once the interest was paid, however, the borrower could 
not sue to recover the amount in excess of 10 percent. This law retained some measure of 
protection for the unwary while generally freeing commercial transactions from restrictions. 
Indeed, by specifically sanctioning any rate that the parties agreed to, the law preempted an 
attempt by a borrower to invoke a common-law anti-usury tradition, and so provided lenders 
with more protection than if no law was in place. 
Although the trend toward deregulation shown in Charts 1 and 2 is clear, individual 
states sometimes, as shown in Table 2, reversed course, depending on current economic 
circumstances. Lawrence Friedman’s (1963) study of Wisconsin tells a story that was 
probably typical, at least for the areas of recent settlement. During the territorial period 
Michigan’s maximum of 7 percent applied. The land boom of the late 1830s led to 
dissatisfaction with this rate. Potential farmers were anxious to acquire land even if it meant 
borrowing at rates above 7 percent. The result was an increase in the legal rate to 12 percent 
if the rate was explicitly stated in the contract. The rate was still 7 percent if no rate was 
stated explicitly. In 1849 the usury law was repealed. Any rate was legal so long as it was 
stated explicitly. A land boom, and hence the need for mortgage money, once more was the 
driving force. Repeal, however lasted only two years. Low wheat prices and the drain of 
labor to California resulting from the Gold Rush put farmers in a bad mood. In 1851 the 23 
legislature, looking for a way to respond to widespread discontent, reinstated the 12 percent 
maximum, and imposed a stiff penalty. Usurious contracts were void and the lender had to 
return 3 times the excess interest. In 1856, in the midst of a long economic expansion, the 
penalties were reduced. Now only the excess interest was voided, and the borrower had to 
make a tender of the principal before the usury defense could be invoked. In 1862 hard 
times occasioned by the outbreak of the Civil War, and the resultant closing of the 
Mississippi, led to a reduction of the maximum rate to 7 percent. In 1866 a postwar land 
boom led the legislature to increase the rate to 10 percent where it remained for the rest of 
the century.   
Samuel Rezneck (1950, 505) noticed a similar phenomenon in the east. A financial 
panic, such as the panic of 1857, hardened attitudes. When market rate pushed through 
interest ceilings merchants and bankers were persuaded that usury laws were disruptive and 
demanded repeal. But opponents of high interest rates also mobilized, and in some cases 
were successful in defeating attempts to repeal the usury laws. 
What had undone the usury laws? One factor I believe, as I argued above, was the 
spread of confidence in Laissez faire in general, and Bentham’s critique of usury laws in 
particular. It was hard to argue for usury laws when all the best economic authorities starting 
with Bentham and Mill opposed them, and when Britain, the most advanced nation, was 
eliminating them.  
In addition, there was the competition among the states for capital. One piece of 
evidence for the role of interstate competition is shown in Figures 1 and 2. The 13 original 
states clearly lagged behind newer regions in the process of liberalization both in terms of 
raising rates and in terms of reducing penalties. Figure 3, which shows maximum rates by 24 
regions, illustrates the point in another way. Liberalization began in the South and Midwest. 
New England eventually liberalized after the Civil War. But the Middle Atlantic States held 
to their tough usury maximums.
18  
The liberalization did not end with the repeal of the usury laws. Instead, the pattern 
was, typically, one of relatively light penalties and usury ceilings that reflected conditions in 
local markets. The pattern of usury ceilings for the postbellum period, thus ended up similar 
to the pattern of regional rates made famous in Davis (1965), at least in terms of the ordering 
of the regions.
19 
Friedman (1963, 517) documents a number of cases in which the fear of a capital 
drain to states with more liberal usury laws was brought up in legislative debates. For 
example a legislative committee in Connecticut in 1871 “painted a picture of money fleeing 
to Massachusetts,” where the usury law had been repealed in 1867. The following year 
Connecticut repealed its usury law, although repeal proved to be short lived. The desire to 
promote expansion of the capital market will also show up when we look at the debate over 
the usury provision of the National Banking Act in section 5. 
It would be natural to conjecture, along the lines of Keynes's discussion of Bentham, 
that the liberalization of the usury laws in the United States was a response to 
industrialization and deepening financial development. Financiers would be strongly 
opposed to usury laws and their influence would increasingly win out against the interests of 
debtors. The influence of finance can be seen at various points in our story. But if this were 
a major factor, we would observe the liberalization occurring first in the Eastern financial 
centers. New York would be leading the way. But this was not the case. The political 
economy of the New York usury law has been traced by Mary Ann Romano (1989, 163-25 
210). In 1837 New York had passed a fairly stiff law that included possible criminal 
penalties (a fine and imprisonment) as well as the civil penalties (loss of principal and 
interest) that were typical and on which I have been focusing. In subsequent years the 
business community steadily pushed for a repeal or at least a liberalization of the law. But it 
was not until the 1880s that they had any real success.
 20 The opposition came from rural 
areas of the state that believed that funds would move toward New York if it were not for 
the leveling effect of the usury law. There is a clear contrast here between the interests of the 
settled agricultural regions of New York, which could offer collateral with well established 
values and could therefore benefit from usury laws, and the interests of the newly settled 
agricultural regions that could compete for capital only by offering to pay high rates. 
Liberalization of the usury laws in short, was mainly the result of western boosterism, a way 
of attracting capital to the frontier, rather than a response to the growing needs of the 
business or industrial communities. 
 At the end of the nineteenth century, enthusiasm for further liberalization waned, 
and a new concern arose: the small household loan. Robinson and Nugent (1934, 40-42) 
locate the growth of this market as an urban and postbellum phenomenon by looking for 
advertisements for small loans in newspaper advertisements, although pawn broking, of 
course, was an ancient phenomenon.
21 These were small loans taken out by the urban poor 
and secured by furniture or salaries. Extraordinarily high rates of interest were common. 
Rates of 10 percent per month were considered “reasonable.” Usury laws, if applicable, 
were ignored. The loan sharks, as they were known, drew the attention of reformers. 
Newspapers ran stories detailing the evils of the small loan market.  Philanthropic 26 
organizations were set up to address the problem by making low interest loans and by 
becoming involved in cases where lenders were pressing borrowers for repayment.  
It was obvious to the reformers that traditional usury laws that limited rates on all 
loans would be inappropriate to deal with the small loan problem. The solution, it was felt, 
was a law that licensed firms making small loans and limited them to rates that assured 
reasonable profits. An 1895 statute in New York was regarded as a model. Only chartered 
lenders could make small (less than  $200) loans. On these loans lenders were limited to 3 
percent per month for the first two months, and 2 percent per month thereafter. Violation of 
the law was made a criminal act. After all, the lender was not an ordinary businessman, but 
rather a “loan shark.” Under the New York law a reward of $250 could be paid for evidence 
of a violation. By 1911 twenty-two states had passed small loan legislation, although the 
Russell Sage Foundation, which had been active in promoting reform, doubted how 
effective these laws really were. The small loan laws reflected the moral justification for 
usury laws, and conceded the broad range of interest rates to the market.  Although we have 
not tested the maximum rates in the small loan laws, it seems likely that they would reflect 
the pattern described by Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998): a more unequal distribution of 
income would imply a more restrictive usury law.  
 
5. The Usury Provision of the National Banking Act 
In general the usury laws, then as now, were state laws. The question of rate 
restriction did come up, however, when the Federal government chartered the First and 
Second Banks of the United States, and when it established the national banking system. 
Alexander Hamilton recommended a maximum rate of six percent for the First Bank of the 27 
United States, and this limit was included in the charter. His argument was mercantilist: 
Low rates were good. A violent reduction of rates would do more harm than good, but a 
gentle nudging of rates downward couldn’t hurt. (Miller 1924, 319).  The Second Bank also 
was limited to 6 percent. (Krooss 1969, pp. 311, 469).
22  The Bank of England, at that time 
was limited by the British usury laws to 5 percent, and the authority of the British model 
may have influenced the Americans.
23 
The issue of usury laws at the Federal level came up again during the Civil War 
when the United States set up the National Banking system. The debate that ensued over 
usury restrictions for the National Banks opens a window on to the mix of ideas and 
interests that were shaping usury laws. 
  At the outbreak of the Civil War the Federal Government created the famous 
greenback dollar. It proved to be surprisingly popular with the general public because it 
provided a uniform currency (a bill that had the same value no matter where it was spent) 
and with the government because it provided revenue. The commercial banking system that 
had produced the paper money before the war, moreover, was in disarray in the Western 
states because banks there had circulated notes backed with bonds issued by southern states, 
and these were now of doubtful value. The problem before the Congress then, was how to 
create a currency that would have the benefits of the greenback -- uniformity, safety, and 
seignorage for the government -- that would at the same time be the basis after the war for a 
private currency backed by gold. The answer was the National Currency Act of 1863, 
creating the National Banking system.  
  In creating the National system Congress had to face the question of what, if any, 
usury restrictions would be placed on the banks. One might assume that since the 
Republican Party was a pro-business, pro-creditor Party it would have opposed lending 28 
restrictions. After all, in the postbellum era the Republican Party would be the defender of 
gold standard orthodoxy. The National Currency Act, however, contained a tough usury 
provision. The law of 1863 provided that the maximum rate that could be charged by a 
National Bank would be “such rate of interest or discount as is at the time the established 
rate of interest for delay in the payment of money, in the absence of contract between the 
parties, by the laws of the several states in which the banks are located.”  The penalty was 
“forfeiture of the debt.”   
This was a strict usury provision on two counts.  First, many usury laws in the 
western states set a lower rate when no rate was specified in the contract than when the rate 
was named explicitly, presumably to protect the unwary borrower. In Illinois the maximum 
was 6 percent when no rate was specified; 10 percent when the rate was specified.  Iowa was the 
same as Illinois.  In Michigan the maximum was 7 percent when no rate was specified; 10 
percent when the rate was specified. California called for 10 percent when no rate was 
specified but permitted any rate so long as it was named in the contract. Forfeiture of the 
whole debt was also strict.  Many western states had much lower penalties.  In Illinois the 
penalty was forfeiture of the whole interest, but not the principal.  In Indiana the penalty was 
simply the return of the “usury,” the interest over the maximum.  In Iowa the interest over 6 
percent went to the School Fund. 
How did this provision get into law?  The National Banking System as a whole was 
the brainchild of Salmon P. Chase, the first Secretary of the Treasury under Lincoln. Chase 
recommended the system in very general terms in the Treasury Report issued in December 
1861.  He argued for the new system partly on practical grounds, it would give additional 
support to the market for federal bonds and additional flexibility in arranging federal 
payments, and also on idealistic grounds, that it was a permanent reform that would 29 
establish a uniform currency without the danger of inflation from a paper currency.  Indeed, 
Andrew McFarland Davis in his classic account of the National Banking Act concludes that 
the establishment of a permanent uniform national currency was Chase’s primary motive.
24  
He had expressed his desire for such a reform as early as his inaugural address as governor 
of Ohio 1856. Chase’s report was forwarded to the House of Ways and Means Committee 
where several hands, in particular Congressmen E.G. Spaulding of New York and Samuel 
Hooper of Massachusetts seem to have been worked on turning Chase’s suggestion into 
law.
25 
Exactly which of these men wrote the tough and complex usury section is not 
known.  But the evidence seems to point to Hooper.  Hooper was a banking theorist as well 
as banker and Congressmen.  He had written articles comparing banking legislation in 
different states, and would have been aware of the inclusion of separate interest maximums 
for contracts in which no explicit mention of a rate was made, and of different types of 
penalties. Hooper also favored strict usury laws. Fritz Redlich in his classic Molding of 
American Banking also attributes the usury provision to Hooper, probably for the same 
psychological reason that I do: Hooper was the theorist.  Redlich, however, fails to 
distinguish between the hybrid 1863 usury provision, and the provision calling for a uniform 
7 percent which Hooper (as we shall see) incorporated in his amended 1864 bill.  This 
mistake led Redlich to deduce that the usury provision had simply been copied from New 
York’s free banking law, which was not the case. 
The Spaulding-Hooper bill was not introduced in the House, however, because of 
the opposition of Thadeus Stevens who preferred the greenback as a way of establishing a 
uniform currency. The bill eventually became law after being introduced in the Senate by 
John Sherman. The debate over the bill was intense, but the usury provision, per se, was not 30 
discussed.  This is hardly surprising.  At issue, or so it seemed, was the future monetary 
system of the United States.  In this context the usury provision was a secondary issue.  But 
once the National Currency Act became law in June 1863 the shortcomings of the usury 
provision were felt. 
The usury provision of the National Currency Act of 1863 was criticized along two 
conflicting lines. (1) The law was inequitable across national banks in different states.  It 
permitted a national bank in a state with a high usury ceiling such as California to charge a 
higher rate than a national bank in a state with a lower ceiling such as Maine. Critics who 
stressed this point generally favored a uniform rate of six or seven percent that would apply 
to National Banks in all states. (2) The law was inequitable across state and national banks 
within a state. A state bank in say, Illinois could charge as much as 10 percent (if the rate 
was stipulated in the contract) and the penalty if they charged more was merely forfeiture of 
the interest. A national bank in the same state was restricted to 6 percent, the rate in Illinois 
when no rate was specified in the contract, and the national bank was subject to the loss of 
both principal and interest if the law was violated. Critics of the law of 1863 who stressed 
this point generally preferred making the national banks subject to state rules on usury. 
Hugh McCulloch, the widely respected former president of the State Bank of 
Indiana, became the first Comptroller of the Currency -- head of the National Banking 
System.
26  He stressed the first criticism of the usury provision in his First Annual Report. 
Instead of the current provision he suggested a maximum rate of 7 percent for all national 
banks, and a penalty of forfeiture of the interest.
27  McCulloch also acknowledged the 
second criticism, that a uniform rate across national banks would work to the disadvantage 
of national banks in the high interest rate regions of the West. But he took the view that high 
rates often encouraged reckless banking.  McCulloch, believed that the success of the State 31 
Bank of Indiana, where he had risen to prominence, was the result, partly, of its charter, 
which included a limit of 6 percent on the interest the bank could charge. (Harding 1895, 
118).  McCulloch noted, moreover, the peculiar property of the usury provision of 1863 that 
it left the setting of the usury rate in the hands of the state, but left the penalty in the hands of 
the federal statute.  He recommended as a second best solution that if the state was allowed 
to fix the rate of interest, it also be allowed to fix the penalty.
28 
McCulloch's reason for supporting usury laws is evidently the same as Adam 
Smith's: Usury laws keep the money away from prodigals and projectors. The similarity of 
their views, of course, does not necessarily mean that McCulloch was influenced directly by 
Smith. Smith’s views probably reflected a working tradition among bankers to which 
McCulloch was also an heir. Nevertheless, McCulloch’s position suggests that the 
mercantilist case for usury laws was still far from dead, even at mid-century. 
What seems to have done in the strict usury provision in the 1863 Act, and the 
milder, but still tough alternatives proposed by McCulloch, wasn’t Bentham’s arguments, 
but rather a more practical problem: Getting banks to convert from state to national status. 
The problem was pointed out in the lead article in Bankers Magazine (Ketchum 1863) 
published a few months before Congress began debating a revised version of the Banking 
Act.  The author, Hiram Ketchum, stressed an important practical consequence of the 
different treatment afforded state and national banks under the usury provision in the 1863 
act: State banks, particularly in the West, were reluctant to join the national system, because 
they could charge higher rates as state banks. Ketchum’s recommendation was that national 
banks be permitted to charge the highest rate allowed in any state, or be free of all controls. 
An important piece of evidence supporting Ketchum’s claim that western state banks 
would not convert until they could compete on the same basis as state banks that didn’t 32 
convert, or other intermediaries, comes from a report made by one of Jay Cooke’s bond 
salesmen. Cooke was the Treasury Department’s chief agent in the sale of government 
bonds during the Civil War.  In November 1863 he received a letter from his agent in 
Michigan outlining the reasons for the slow sale of government bonds to potential national 
banks.  In part the agent wrote the problem was: 
The low rate of interest permitted – seven per cent only in Michigan, whereas state 
law permits 10 per cent. (by contract) and throughout the greater portion of the 
state the actual rate is 1 ½ to 2 per cent. a month. …Quite a large amount of 5-20’s 
[a federal bond, 5 percent per year for 20 years] are now held by bankers and 
others in interior towns of Michigan and still more will be purchased for the use in 
banking under the Act…the hope being strong that the coming Congress will 
allow interest to be charged on loans in accordance with state enactments… 
Oberholtzer (1907, 357). 
 
McCulloch’s recommendation of a flat 7 percent for all National Banks, however, 
was far from dead.  He was strongly supported by a committee of bankers from New York 
who lobbied McCulloch and the House Ways and Means Committee, probably in the first 
weeks of March 1864.
29  The interest of the New York bankers in a national 7 percent 
maximum is clear. New York’s state usury law set a maximum of 7 percent. State banks and 
National banks would be on a par in New York, and conversion to the national system 
would be unimpeded. In the west, however, bankers would prefer the state system, and 
access to state usury laws. The national banks of New York would come to dominate the 
system. And if note issue were confined to national banks, it would be the notes of the New 
York national banks that would circulate throughout the country.  
Although I have seen no explicit evidence, it is likely that the committee of bankers 
also lobbied for a clause permitting the Secretary of the Treasury, or some similar authority, 
to suspend the usury laws in major financial centers during a crisis, a policy that McCulloch 33 
supported.
30 Such flexibility would have been important for bankers who could still 
remember the levels reached by interest rates during the Panic of 1857. 
In any event McCulloch’s recommendation of a uniform 7 percent interest rate 
ceiling was incorporated in the bill introduced in the House by Samuel Hooper in April 
1864.  Here it was strongly criticized by Congressmen from the Western states who 
emphasized the inequality between state and national banks that would develop in their 
states if a uniform rate were adopted.  Blaine (of Maine!) offered an amendment substituting 
the language “[the maximum rate of interest] established by law in the state where the bank 
is located” for the uniform rate.  Blaine’s purpose was actually to restrict the national banks 
in Maine to the state interest ceiling of 6 percent.  But he was strongly seconded by Cole of 
California who argued that there would be a great disparity between the then current rate in 
California of 2 percent or more per month and the uniform 7 percent rate in the House bill.  
Cole finished his speech by endorsing Blaine’s proposal: 
Mr. Cole.  …"In New England the rate of interest is six percent; but it is not so in the 
western states.  In Iowa it is different; and there is no reason for creating this discord 
by establishing a rate of interest for States different from what prevails there by their 
own laws.  Therefore I am in favor of striking out the section [providing for a 
uniform rate], thereby leaving the matter entirely under the control of the several 
States.  That is the proposition of the gentleman from Maine.  He proposes to leave it 
to the local legislation of the several States entirely." 
 
Mr. Blaine.  "Entirely."
31 
 
Other Congressman supported Cole’s point that a uniform rate would discourage 
conversion to national status or the settling up of national banks in high interest rate states. 
Higby of California went so far as to claim that no national banks would be set up in his 
state where high rates of interest were the norm.  He himself was paying two percent per 
month at that very moment!
32 Blaine’s amendment was adopted, but as it turns out it did not 
provide the actual text of the law of 1864. In a peculiar turn of events a second amendment 34 
limiting the rate of interest to 6 percent was adopted leaving the usury section in a confused 
state. This version of the Currency Act was later tabled, and a second bill, again 
incorporating a uniform rate, was introduced in the House. 
The actual source of the usury formula in the Act of 1864 was a Senate amendment 
proposed by the Senate Finance Committee. I have not seen any direct references to what 
happened in the Finance Committee. But we do know that in January 1864 Jay Cooke 
dispatched his brother Henry to talk with John Sherman, the chairman of the Finance 
Committee, and Salmon Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, about needed revisions in the 
law. And the next month Sherman’s Finance Committee reported out a series of 
amendments to the 1863 law including the language of the 1864 usury section which 
allowed the national banks to follow the usury law of the state where the bank was located.  
It may be that the Finance Committee rejected the uniform rate in favor of a rate to be 
determined by state law partly as a result of Cooke’s lobbying effort.
33 
This amendment was debated in the Senate on May 5 with the Senators going over 
much of the same ground as the Representatives had earlier. Grimes of Iowa complained 
that National Banks in one state could end up charging more than national banks in 
neighboring states.
34 But Trumbull of Illinois argued that state banks would not convert 
unless given equal freedom to lend under the national characters. He told the Senate that 
leading bankers from Chicago had made this point to him.
35  
Senator Henderson of Iowa then raised the point that in his state note issuing banks 
were under a lower interest-rate ceiling than private lenders.
36  Several attempts were made 
to amend the usury section to make the rate applying to state banks the relevant rate. But 
there were objections. Some states, for example, did not create banks of issue. Perhaps most 35 
telling was the brief interjection by Lane of Kansas who pointed out that in his state private 
bankers took advantage of the higher ceiling for private lenders and yet issued notes that 
circulated as money.
37  Evidently, limiting the national banks to the rate permitted under 
state law for incorporated banks of issue would discourage entrepreneurs from setting up 
national banks in Kansas because they could not offer investors the same return as private 
bankers. 
It is possible that his remark rang a bell with Sherman.  In 1850 Ohio (Sherman’s 
state) had passed the so–called “ten percent interest law” that allowed private lenders 10 
percent while banks of issue were limited to 6 percent. The law produced a number of 
unfortunate consequences. (Huntington 1915)  For one thing state chartered banks largely 
abandoned discounting home paper and concentrated on bills of exchange payable out of 
state because fees for “exchange” were not easily attacked under the usury laws.  More 
important for our purpose, the ten percent law discouraged investment in banks of issue.  
Investors in Ohio preferred putting their capital into private banks or banks chartered in 
other states.  The result was that the currency in Ohio contained a large admixture of notes 
issued by private bankers and by banks in other states.  Indeed, the ten percent law was the 
major cause of the lack of uniformity in Ohio’s currency that Chase complained of during 
his inaugural address as Governor of Ohio in 1856, the position he held before becoming 
Secretary of the Treasury. (Huntington 1915, 450) The ten percent law was abandoned in 
1859. 
In the end, Fessenden of Maine, another key member of the Finance Committee, cut 
the debate short by offering to fix up the amendment.  When Sherman reported the new 
wording two days later it contained the phrase, “except that where by the laws of any State a 36 
different rate is limited for banks of issue organized under State laws, the rate so limited 
shall be allowed for associations organized in any such State under this act.”  The effect of 
Fessenden’s rewording, on close reading, was to give the national banks favored status. 
They could take the rate permitted private investors if that rate was higher, or use the rate 
allowed to banks of issue if that was higher. Nothing like the disaster that had occurred 
under Ohio’s ten percent law could now occur under the national banking act.  This wording 
was adopted without further debate.
38 Evidently, the desire to get capital flowing into the 
National Banking system in the Western states had triumphed over any lingering regard for 
usury laws. 
 
6. Did Liberalizing the Usury Laws Have Any Impact? 
 
I have been concerned so far with the usury laws as a case study in the causes of 
economic regulation. It is natural to ask whether the liberalization of the usury laws had any 
impact on the economy. The conventional wisdom among economic historians, as noted 
above, seems to be that usury laws have no significant effect because they were easily 
evaded. The borrower and lender simply wrote a contract that hid the usury. But for a 
number of reasons the history of the usury laws developed above and other evidence 
developed by economic historians makes me skeptical of the conventional wisdom.  
(1) Usury laws are inherently popular because they speak to fundamental ethical 
concerns. Why liberalize them if they have no economic effect? Why, to be a bit more 
specific, should legislators have risked the wrath of a large segment of the public who 
believed that usury was immoral by raising maximum rates or lowering penalties if the only 37 
savings to the business community was the ink on loan contracts? Yet as we have seen, 
legislators persistently did make the effort to liberalize the laws. 
(2) The conventional wisdom assumes that judges can’t or won’t see beyond the 
legal document placed in front of them. Judges do, of course, put a lot of weight on signed 
documents. Nevertheless, there must be some risk when a usury law is on the books that a 
judge will be sympathetic to the borrower, and willing to believe whatever proofs of usury 
the borrower can muster.  
(3) In most circumstances the effects of liberalizing moderate usury laws are likely 
to be hard to see: the reallocation of some capital from lower risk to higher risk investments. 
But when abrupt and far-ranging changes are made in the usury laws the results will be 
visible. Two examples from our narrative are the difficulties that arose from the Ohio 10-
percent law and from the attempt to establish a uniform rate in the National Currency Act 
(1863).  
(4) Leslie Pressnell’s classic study, Country Banking in the Industrial Revolution 
(1956) shows that British usury laws appear to have had (Pressnell is careful not to go 
beyond his evidence) an important effect on country banks in England during the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. (Pressnell 1956, 285-88, 316-21, and passim). Rather than 
change their lending rate when equilibrium interest rates rose above the usury rate, and thus 
risk writing contracts that could not be enforced, country banks responded by changing the 
length of loans.
39  Pressnell (1956, 321) concludes that:  “The relaxation of the usury laws in 
fact introduced into the money market a flexibility much greater than is immediately visible: 
against higher rates of interest, bankers could discount longer bills, or allow clients to draw 
for shorter periods than had hitherto been possible.” Clapham (1970, volume 2, 15) writng 38 
about the period before 1833 says that while bill brokers might have circumvented the usury 
law by charging a commission, and private bankers might have done so by requiring 
compensating balances, "that was not for the Bank [of England]; and so it suffered." 
(5) Lance Davis’s classic study of the financing of the New England textile mills 
argued that the usury laws in Massachusetts were “fairly well observed, at least by the major 
institutional lenders, until the mid 1850s.” (Davis 1960, 3)  The tendency, that Davis 
observed, for the usury laws to lose their effect as mid-century approached may have been 
due to the reduction in the penalties in Massachusetts discussed above. Similarly, Barry 
Eichengreen’s study of the mortgage rates at the end of the nineteenth century (1984) found 
some impact from usury limits, when the limits were relatively low, on mortgage rates. And 
Ken Snowden (1988) found additional evidence of an impact on mortgage rates in urban 
markets.
40 It seems likely that the impact of usury limits would have been larger earlier in 
the century when penalties were higher.
41 
(6) Eugene White generously gave me access to the data for his study of the 
California Bank of A. Levy (2001). Levy was lending money in a state that permitted any 
rate so long as it was stated explicitly in the contract. A rate of 10 percent applied when no 
rate was stated explicitly. It turns out in White’s sample that if, say, 10 percent had been 
made the maximum rate, then 15.4 percent of Levy’s loans by count and 30.7 percent by 
value would have been illegal. Would Levy have continued to place such a large fraction of 
his funds in loans that could be challenged in court, or would have reacted as Adam Smith 
suggested, and lent a larger proportion to lower-risk borrowers at a lower rate? Economic 
historians have become increasingly aware of the importance of the law when it comes to 39 
other forms of property rights – bankruptcy law, the law of negotiable instruments, etc. – 
why should usury laws be an exception? 
 (7) The most visible sign of an impact from the usury laws would be in the courts. 
And here one must concede the evidence is mixed. Robert Wright (2001, 29-41) undertook 
an exhaustive examination of colonial records and found no evidence of the usury defense. 
His unequivocal conclusion is that the colonial usury laws were a dead letter. On the other 
hand, there is evidence from the nineteenth century that the usury defense was invoked from 
time to time, and that the courts took the law of usury seriously.  
I looked at the Supreme Court Cases involving usury in the nineteenth century. 
There were simply too many cases to read if one looked at lower courts, and the Supreme 
Court would reflect the national picture. A reading of the cases suggests that there were 
about 60 cases before the Supreme Court between 1800 and 1900 in which usury laws 
played a significant role in the case, about one every 1.6 years. (There were many additional 
cases in which the law of usury was cited in the course of the argument by way of analogy.)  
The number of cases fluctuated somewhat from period to period. The 1830s (10 cases) and 
the 1870s (also 10 cases) and the 1890s (14 cases) stand out. These were also, of course, 
periods of economic distress.  
The amounts involved were substantial in today’s money. Dundas v. Hitchcock 
(1851) began with a bond for $620,530.96 written in 1838 ($11, 700,000 in 2001 using a 
Consumer Price Index). In the Bank of the United States v. Herbert G. Waggener, George 
Wagley and Alexander Miller (1835) the case arose from a $5,000 obligation paying 6 
percent purchased by the Bank of the United States in 1822, but paid for with notes of the 
Bank of Kentucky which were then depreciated from 30 to 40 percent in the market. 40 
($75,000 in 2001 using a Consumer Price Index – and ignoring the depreciation of the 
notes). Levy v. Gadsby (1805) began with a note for $1,436.62 created in 1797 ($20,000 in 
2001 using a Consumer Price Index).  
The Supreme Court, as might be imagined, was asked to settle a variety of thorny 
legal issues. In a few cases these were simply technical legal questions that could have 
arisen under other laws, for example the proper instruction of juries. Most of the cases, 
however, meant settling the law of usury. In a number of cases the old question of whether 
various devices constituted prohibited attempts to evade the usury laws played a prominent 
role in the case. In the United States  v. Waggener  (1835) the loan made by the Bank of the 
United States was legal on the face of it (6 percent as required by the bank’s charter) but 
usurious when the depreciated market value of the Bank of Kentucky notes was taken into 
account. Reading between the lines, there seems to be a suggestion that the borrowers may 
have had the usury defense in mind when they insisted on the Bank of Kentucky notes. In 
United States Mortgage Company v. Sperry (1891) the issue was whether unpaid interest 
added to the principal could in some way render the original loan usurious. In Cockle et al. 
v. Flack et al. (1876) the case involved a meat packer in Peoria who had borrowed from a 
merchant in Baltimore who also charged a commission for selling the final product. The 
commission was charged whether or not the product was sold. The question was whether 
those commissions were a dodge for evading the usury law. In Call v. Palmer (1885) the 
issue was whether an agent who exacted a separate commission could render the contract 
between the principal and the borrower usurious. In Wheeler v. National Bank (1877) the 
case revolved around a bill of exchange on which it was alleged the bank had charged an 
excessive amount for exchange in order to evade the usury law. 41 
As might be imagined, conflicts among usury laws in different states had to be 
resolved. In Tilden v. Blair (1874), for example, the case centered on a bill that was drawn 
in one state on the resident of another. The bill was accepted in the second state and returned 
to the first state where it was negotiated for a price that would have implied usurious interest 
in the second state but not in the first. The creation of federal institutions also created the 
need for Supreme Court interpretations. Fleckner v. the President, Directors, and Company 
of the Bank of the United States (1823) addressed the six percent usury provision of the 
charter of the Bank of the United States.  A number of cases including Tiffany vs. National 
Bank of Missouri (1872) and National Bank v. Johnson (1881) were aimed at settling the 
interpretation of the usury provision of the National Banking Act and its amendments.
42 The 
willingness of the Supreme Court to hear these cases shows that it took the proper 




Usury laws are not, at the moment, at the top of the political agenda, although there 
has been some concern with “payday” loans. We should not, however, ignore usury laws on 
that account. Economic regulation and deregulation is a hardy perennial. And usury laws 
provide a good case study of how economic regulation is shaped through the interaction of 
economic ideas and economic conditions. During the colonial era the United States, like 
Britain, had a strict set of usury laws. Maximum rates appear relatively low to a modern eye, 
and penalties for violating the laws appear tough. During the Antebellum period, however, 
these laws were gradually liberalized or repealed, although some states clung to their laws, 
and the system has never been abandoned. 42 
Part of the explanation for the liberalization is the rise of faith in Laissez Faire, and 
more particularly in Bentham’s case against the usury laws. The influence of ideas on 
legislation is always difficult to prove. But it seems plausible that at the margin the strong 
consensus among economists, using the term broadly, that Bentham had won the theoretical 
argument must have had an impact. As one dogged supporter of usury laws in Wisconsin 
was forced to admit he “did not believe in the principle of free trade in money – not because 
he could reply to the arguments of those who were in favor of it – they had all the arguments 
in their favor” but because “experience has taught us that it is unjust.” (Quoted in Friedman 
1963, 556).  
Ideas, however, are not the whole story. As late as the Civil War there was a nearly 
successful attempt to incorporate a maximum lending rate that would have been applicable 
nationwide in the National Banking system despite the free market consensus among 
economists. Competition among the states for capital was also important in undermining the 
usury laws. Engerman, Haber and Sokoloff,  (2001, 25) have argued recently that voting 
restrictions were eased in western states in order to attract settlers. Similarly, usury laws 
were eased in order to attract capital. This was especially true in the early days of settlement 
when uncertainty produced high interest rates and potential farmers needed mortgage money 
to buy land. The fear that capital would leave a state that maintained tough usury laws was a 
powerful argument in the hands of those who favored an unfettered capital market.  43 
 
Table 1. A Chronology of British Usury Laws 
 
Date  Maximum Rate   Penalties/Comment 
Before 1545  0%  Lending at interest was practiced, however, often by 
members of groups that were not restricted by the usual 
social norms. From the time of Richard I the law 
recognized, generally, although not continuously, that 
Jews were lending at interest and regulated the rate. In 
1233, for example, Henry III set the maximum rate that 
could be charged by Jews at two pence per pound per 
week, a simple rate of about 43 percent, or about 54 
percent when compounded. The Jews were expelled in 
1290. 
 
1545  10%   Forfeiture of three times the principal and interest, fines, 
imprisonment, and ransom at the King’s pleasure. 
1552  0%  Forfeiture of principal and interest and fines, 
imprisonment, and ransom at the King’s pleasure. 
1571  10%  Forfeiture of three times the principal and interest and 
fines, imprisonment, and ransom at the King’s pleasure. 
Courts would not enforce recovery of more than the 
principal. 
1624  8%  Forfeiture of three times the principal and interest. 
1660  6%   Forfeiture of three times the principal and interest. 
1713  5%  Forfeiture of three times the principal and interest. 
1833  Usury limits removed for bills of exchange with 3 months or less to run; 
part of the Bank Charter Act. This law frees the Bank of England to raise its 
discount rate. 
1854  Final repeal of the Usury laws. By this time only limits on rates charged on 
mortgages secured by land remained on the books. 
1900  Moneylenders Act restores the defense of usury. 
Sources and Notes: This table has been compiled from various secondary sources, such as 
Smith (1979[1776], 106), Holdsworth (1903, volume 8, 110-113), Robinson and Nugent 
(1935, 28-29), and Jones (1989). It is intended merely to provide a broad-brush picture of 
the liberalization of the British laws.    
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Table 2. Chronological History of the Repeal of U.S. Usury Laws in the 
Nineteenth Century 
Year in which the usury law was repealed  State 
1818-1818  Alabama 
1818-1821  Mississippi 
1819-1832  Illinois 
1822-1829  Florida 
1831-1832  Indiana 
1832-1832  Florida 
1849-1851  Wisconsin 
1850  California 
1851-1852  Iowa 
1851-1859  Minnesota 
1852-1881  New Mexico 
1854-1862  Oregon 
1854  Washington 
1855-1860  Nebraska 
1859-1859  Kansas 
1860  Louisiana 
1861  Nevada 
1862  Colorado 
1864-1870  Idaho 
1865  Arizona 
1865  Montana 
1865   North Dakota 
1865  Rhode Island 
1866  Florida 
1866-1876  South Carolina 
1867  Massachusetts 
1868-73  Arkansas 
1869  Utah 
1869  Wyoming 
1870  Maine 
1870-75  Texas 
1872-1872  Connecticut 
1873-1874  Georgia 
1873-1874  Mississippi 
1877  Connecticut 
1881  North Dakota 
Source and Notes: (Holmes 1892, 436-442). The table includes states in which 
there existed a maximum rate when no rate was specified explicitly in the 
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1 I wish to thank Eugene White for sharing his Bank of A. Levy data, and Zorina Khan for 
helping me get started on the court cases on usury. They, along with Howard Bodenhorn, 
Michael Bordo, and Ira Gang, also made a number of helpful suggestions for improving a 
previous draft. I am also grateful for the chance to present the paper at a seminar at Rutgers 
and at the seminar in honor of Stanley E. Engerman held at the University of Rochester.  
 
2 This tactic known was known as “note shaving” in nineteenth century America. 
 
3 The use of protested bills to evade Virginia's usury laws is also mentioned in Farnam 
(1938, 91). 
 
4 Payday loans are discussed in “Risky Business: Exploiting a Loophole, Banks Skirt State 
Laws On High Interest Rates,” By Paul Beckett, Wall Street Journal. Friday, May 25, 2001, 
1+. Some lenders rely on national banks for their capital because national banks can charge 
interest rates based on the law of the state where the bank is located rather than where the 
borrower is located. The origin of this arrangement is discussed in section 5.  
 
5 Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998, 23-36) provide a wide-ranging summary. 
 
6 I have relied mainly on Noonan (1957) and Nelson (1969). 
 
7Nelson's emphasis on Calvin was vigorously challenged by George (1957). 
 
8 Although Steuart was clearly Smith's bête noire, it is one of Smith's affectations that he 
never cites Steuart by name. 
 
9 Richard Brinsley Sheridan's classic, "The School for Scandal," a play about a prodigal son, 
complete with Jewish moneylender, was first produced on Drury Lane in 1777.  
 
10 Smith's departure from Laissez Faire in this case, as in similar cases, has continued to 
attract the attention of economists and historians of economic thought. See, for example, 
Blitz and Long (1965), Jadlow (1977), and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The latter provide a 
rationale similar to Smith's. These and other interpretations are discussed in Paganelli 
(2003), who argues that although modern economists have sympathized with Smith, they 
have not really understood him because Smith was willing to stipulate permanent 
misperceptions of reality, an assumption at variance with modern economic thinking. In the 
present case, the willingness of prodigals and projectors to enter into contracts that reduce 
their wealth is a case in point. 
 
11 The reception of the Defense of Usury is described in Stark's introduction to the economic 




12 Usury laws were actually repealed only in Alabama and Mississippi, and then only for a 
time. 
 
13 Kish-Goodling (1998) provides a superb overview of the economic meaning of the play, 
and a number of suggestions for using the play as a tool for teaching monetary economics. 
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